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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
A RECAPITULATION
ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS*
A. J. THOMAS, JR.t
INTRODUCTIONS TUDENTS of the law, matured under the civil law theories of
community property, have long gazed with wondering pity
upon the plight of their common law brethren in their attempts
to modernize the primitive concept of the role of married women
in today's economic world. By faltering steps the common law
has been forced to retreat from the medieval concept that a mar-
ried woman was entitled only to her immortal soul, all else being
naturally and properly her husband's, to the position now held in
most common law areas where statutory decrees permit married
women rights in their own property.
Under the community property system, few, if any, fundamental
alterations have been necessary to adapt it to the present day needs
of husbands and wives. The concept of marriage as a partnership
in which all property possessed by the husband and wife is pre-
sumed to be common property, belonging to both by halves, with
the husband as the managing partner, needs neither rationalization
nor apologia.
Nevertheless, these two radically different concepts flourish side
by side throughout the western world, and in some instances, not-
ably the United States, are found beneath the same flag. Because
of their proximity and the modern tendency to move onward and
try other pastures, there has arisen a field of legal problems con-
cerning the law which governs the marital ownership of property,
*Former American Diplomat, Member of the Texas Bar.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
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both movable and immovable,' acquired by spouses in states other
than that in which they are presently domiciled, or in which they
were married, or to which they moved after marriage.2
EXPRESS AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS
It is no longer a customary part of the marriage ceremony in
the United States for spouses to enter into an express contract gov-
erning their rights and interests in property they presently own
or that they will acquire in the future. Occasionally such a con-
tract crops up where a couple wishes to be governed by an arrange-
ment other than that provided for by the marital property laws of
the domicile or where one spouse wishes to settle a sum of money
on the other as separate property. On the other hand, pre-nuptial
agreements are almost a traditional part of matrimony in Europe,
and a goodly portion of the Europeans immigrating to these shores
and to other lands are parties to express pre-nuptial contracts. It
is from this situation that most of the present day problems relat-
ing to express contracts and matrimonial property arise.
The first question frequently encountered is whether or not fu-
ture acquisitions are within the scope of the pre-nuptial contract.
For example, an ante-nuptial contract is made in one state and
later the parties change their domicile and acquire property in
I See GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 453 (3rd ed. 1949) for the
meaning of movables and immovables in conflict of laws.
2 For discussion of this subject, see the following authorities: 2 BEALE, A TrEATISE
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 237.1, 238.1, 238.2, 289.1, 290.1, 292.1, 292.2, 293.1, 293.2
(1935) ; DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF LOUISIANA, 102-118 (1945) ;
I DE FUNIATC, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY, 236-254 (1943) ; DICEY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS, 557-558, 565-569, 711-721 (4th ed. 1927) ; GOODRICH, HANDBOOK ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, 376-392 (3rd ed. 1949) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 237, 238,
289-293 (1934); RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 328-382
(1945) ; STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 192-225 (7th ed. 1872) ;
STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 284-290 (1937); 1 WHARTON, TREATISE ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, 400-434 (3rd ed. 1905) ; Harding, Matrimonial Domicile and Marital
Rights in Movables, 30 MICH. L. REv. 859 (1932) ; Horowitz, Conflict of Law Problems
in Community Property, 11 WASH. L. REV. 121, 212 (1936); Leflar, Community Prop-
erty and the Conflict of Laws, 21 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1932) ; Neuner, MARUTAL PROPERTY
AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 5 LA. L. REv. 167 (1943) ; Stone, The Law Governing Rights
in Property under a Pre-Nuptial Contract, 13 B. U. L. REV. 219 (1933); Stumberg,
Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, 11 TEx. L. REV. 53 (1934); Note, Marital
Property and Conflict of Laws, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1286 (1930).
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another state. It has frequently been reiterated that a change of
domicile does not work any change of law governing the construc-
tion of a contract.' This is undoubtedly true with respect to prop-
erty, wherever situated, which falls within the scope of the con-
tract. Thus, in cases involving ante-nuptial agreements, the courts
will first determine what property falls within the boundries of the
agreement, and this is to be gleaned by surveying the intentions of
the parties to be gathered from the instrument itself in the light
of all its surrounding circumstances.'
The general line of decisions have dealt harshly with pre-
nuptial contracts, holding, as illustrated by the famous Texas case
of Castro v. lilies,5 that where there has been a change of domicile
after making an express pre-nuptial contract, the law of the after-
acquired domicile will govern as to all after-acquired property un-
less the contract was made with reference to that law, or in view
of a change of domicile, and it was the clear intention of the
parties that the contract should govern wherever they should
reside.
Where there is an express nuptial contract, and, to quote Justice
Story, "if it speaks fully to the very point"6 it will generally be
admitted to govern all the property of the parties, not only in the
matrimonial domicile, but in every other place under the limita-
tions and restrictions which apply to other cases of contracts, that
is, that they are not in contravention of the laws or policy of the
country where they are sought to be enforced, nor prejudicial to
the rights of its own citizens who contract with such parties with
regard to notice of their marriage contract.7
It has been the established policy in the American community
3 DeLane v. Moore, 14 How. 253 (1852); Murphy v. Murphy, 5 Mart. 83, 12 Am.
Dec. 475 (La. 1817) ; Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548 (1853) ; Lemye v. Sirkee, 226 App.
Div. 159, 235 N. Y. S. 273 (1929) ; LeBreton v. Miles, 8 Paige 261, 4 N. Y. Chan. Rep.
422 (1840) ; McLeod v. Board, 30 Tex. 238, 94 Am. Dec. 301 (1867).
4 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 1015; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 333,
n. 40; Leflar, supra, note 2, at 224.
522 Tex. 479, 73 Am. Dec. 277 (1858).
6 STORY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 143, 184, 185.
7 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at § 201, p. 434.
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property states to permit their citizens to make pre-nuptial con-
tracts that their matrimonial property rights shall be governed by
an arrangement other than that provided for by local law.' Some
community property states have even gone so far as to recognize
post-nuptial agreements for this purpose. Thus it cannot be said
to be against the strong public policy of community property law
to enforce pre-nuptial contracts made elsewhere even though they
have the effect of nullifying the community of holdings.
Nevertheless, from the leading decisions' in both community
property and civil law states it would appear that a heavier burden
is placed upon the ante-nuptial contract to test its effects as to
after-acquired property when the parties have effected a change of
domicile than would have been the case if the contract were con-
strued at the place of making, for, in the latter instant, the court
would merely ascertain the intentions of the parties from the terms
of the particular agreement and the conditions existing at the time
of its execution to discover whether or not the contract covered
after-acquired property; and, if it was found to do so, theoretically
a change of domicile should have no effect thereon.
If a marriage contract makes no provision with regard to after-
acquired property, the contract would have no influence beyond the
jurisdictional laws of the country where it was made, and the law
of the actual domicile will govern the rights of the parties as to all
future acquisitions.1"
The second question which arises in connection with pre-nuptial
agreements is which law governs the interpretation of such con-
91 1;: FUNIAK, O1. cit. supra, note 2, at § 90, p. 244. ARIZONA CODE. ANN., 1939, § 63-
201: CALIF. CIvI. Coie. 1941, § 177-181; IDAHO CODE ANN., 1932, §§ 31-917, 31-921;
LA. Civit. CoinE, 1932, Art. 1743; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS, 1929, § 3373; NEw MEx. STAT.
ANN., 1929. §§ 68.201, 68-204; Ore. Laws, 1943, Chap. 440, § 10; Tex. REV. CIV. STAT.
(Vernon, 1936), Art. 4610-4612; WASH. REV. STAT. (Remington, 1932), § 6894.
9 Long v. Hess, 154 111. 482, 40 N. E. 335, 27 A. L. R. 791 (1895) ; Besse v. Pellochoux,
73 Ill. 285, 24 Am. Rep. 242 (1874); Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 Pac. 1025
(1913) ; Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wis. 256, 1 Am. Rep. 180 (1869) ; Kneeland v. Ensley, 19
Tenn. 60, 33 Am. Dec. 168 (1838) ; See Hoefer v. Probasco, 80 Okla. 261, 196 Pac. 138
(1921) wherein additional cases are cited.
10 Besse v. Pellochoux, 73 111. 285, 24 Am. Rep. 242 (1874) ; Gale v. Davis Heirs,
4 Mart. (0. S.) 645 (La. 1817); Lyon v. Knott, 26 Miss. 548 (1853); LeBreton v.
Miles, 8 Paige 261, 4 N. Y. Chan. Rep. 422 (1840).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tracts. It has been held in the majority of cases" that ante-nuptial
agreements, in absence of good reason to the contrary, must be
construed with reference to the law of the husband's actual domi-
cile at the time of the marriage. A good reason to the contrary
would appear to be illustrated by a case where the parties do
intend to settle in some place not the domicile of the husband;
thus, in a British case,'" the husband was domiciled in Turkey and
the bride was an Englishwoman; at the time of the pre-nuptial
agreement the husband had expressed the intention of immediately
moving to England and making his domicile there; the British
court held that the parties contracted with the intention that Eng-
land should be the matrimonial domicile, and therefore the pre-
nuptial contract should be construed according to British laws.
Suppose a husband and wife, French citizens residing in Paris,
provide in their nuptial agreement that the contract shall not be
construed by the matrimonial domiciliary law but by some foreign
law, say the law of China. Would such a provision be valid? There
is no clear line of decisions on this point. In England the validity
of such a provision has been affirmed,'" on the other hand both
Germany and Louisiana" have refused to enforce such provi-
sions. This would appear to be the better rule unless the law desig-
nated is that of the country to which the parties intend to move
immediately after marriage, or unless it is the law of the place
where certain property mentioned in the contract is situated.
One final question occasionally occurs in connection with ex-
press marital agreements, and that is whether, after marriage, a
pre-nuptial contract can be changed or amended or a new contract
entered into by the consent of the parties. It has been held that
11 Le Breton v. Miles, 8 Paige 261, N. Y. Chan. Rep. 422 (1840) ; Vidtz v. O'Hagan,
2 Ch. 87 (1900) ; Dicmy, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 713.
12 Colliss v. Hector, L. R. 19 Eq. 334, 44 L. J. Ch. N. S. 267, 32 L. T. N. S. 223, 23
Week Rep. 485 (1875).
13 Este v. Smyth, 18 Beav. 112, 23 L. J. Ch. N. S. 705, 18 Jur. 300, 12 Week Rep. 148
(1854) ; See also, Re Megret, 1 Ch. 547, 84 L. T. N. S. 192 (1901).
14 GERMAN CIVIL CODE, § 1433 as cited in 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 365.
15 Morales v. Marigny, 14 La. Ann. 855 (1859) ; Bourcier v. Lanusse, 3 Mart. 581
(La., 1815).
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this is a matter to which the law of the actual domicile must be
applied. 6 The French law 7 forbids this; Louisiana, following the
law of France, declares that the contract must be made prior to
marriage, yet it takes a queer quirk by permitting express contracts
to be made after marriage in cases of persons moving into Louisi-
ana after they have been married and resided elsewhere.'" Under
English common law, a married woman is incapable of thus modi-
fying or surrendering her estate. 9 In the Soviet Union, the 1926
Code on Marriage, which introduced the marital community prop-
erty system, prohibits any agreement between spouses intended to
restrict the property rights of either one.2" Germany, on the other
hand, in the interest of domestic harmony permits the making of
post-nuptial agreements, 21 particularly in cases where spouses
have changed domiciles, under the theory that parties should be
permitted to adapt their property relations to their new legal sur-
roundings, irrespective of the municipal law of the first state and
the general conflicts rule of the second.
An interesting case on a post-nuptial agrement recently arose in
Texas. 22 Two spouses were desirous of partitioning their commu-
nity property and establishing separate funds. They went to New
York and transferred $5,800 of their community funds to a New
York bank. There the husband withdrew $4,000 of the amount
which he had paid to him in two containers each consisting of
2,000 silver dollars. The remainder of the money was drawn in
four cashier's checks which were endorsed by the spouses and
placed in the respective containers. The husband and wife then
entered into a contract whereby each transferred to the other the
16 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 429, n. 10.
17 CODE NAPOLEON, Arts. 1394, 1395, as cited in DAGCETT, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 114.
is Act 236 of 1910, amending Art. 2329, LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870 (Merrick's 3rd ed.
1925).
19 Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wis. 256, 1 Am. Rep. 180 (1869).
20 1 GsovsKI, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 132 (1948).
21 Fuss v. Fuss, 24 Wis. 256, 1 Am. Rep. 180 (1869) ; See also Pattison v. Pattison,
129 Kan. 558, 283 Pac. 483 (1930).
22 King. v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S. W. (2d) 803 (1947).
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contents of his container. Thereafter the wife deposited her share
in a bank in Fort Worth, where it was immediately garnisheed by
a judgment creditor of the husband. The husband set up the New
York contract to defeat the garnishment. The court held that the
property was not the separate property of the wife in spite of the
post-nuptial contract. It supported its decision on two grounds: (1)
that such a contract was against the public policy of Texas; and
(2) that although generally the validity of a contract is controlled
by the laws of the state where it is made and performed, yet, as
between spouses, the rule of domicile dominates.
Although in the issue at hand the court did not enter into a
discussion of post-nuptial contracts, yet the agreement between
these spouses falls under the definition of that term, and it is sub-
mitted that the Texas Supreme Court might well have based its
ruling on the theory that Texas does not permit post-nuptial con-
tracts to govern the rights and interests of the spouses in their
presently owned property.
It is conceded that the above discussion is purely academic for,
as a result of the decision in King v. Bruce, an amendment" to
the state constitution was adopted in November, 1948, which per-
mits husband and wife to partition community property, by an
instrument in writing, into undivided shares or in severalty, which
shall be the separate property of each spouse, provided such parti-
tion does not prejudice the rights of prior creditors or bona fide
third parties dealing with the spouses. Thus, it would appear that
Texas has veered completely from the orbit of the British and
French decisions which prohibit post-nuptial contracts, and has
come to accept the German view that such contracts are per-
missible.
IMPLIED CONTRACTS
Early in the history24 of the development of conflict of laws
and its relationship to marital property, a French writer, Dumou-
23 Tzx. CONST., Art. XVI, § 15, as amended Nov. 2, 1948.
24 The year 1525.
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lin, gave birth to a theory which has ever since been a stumbling
block to courts and legal writers alike.
Dumoulin's theory itself was simple, but complicated develop-
ments followed in its wake. He declared that at the time of mar-
riage the parties were free to make any settlement they chose and
the effects of that marriage upon the property of the spouses
should be determined primarily by the intentions of the parties. 5
Beginning with this theorem, the French courts developed the cor-
olary which stated that if parties to a marriage do not make an
express pre-nuptial contract, it is assumed that the parties intended
by a tacit or implied contract to submit themselves to the control
of the law of their first matrimonial domicile.26 Therefore, accord-
ing to French reasoning, once the marital domicile was established,
a wife's matrimonial rights to her husband's estate had been
vested,27 and could not be subsequently stripped from her by mov-
ing elsewhere.2"
The justification for this rule is based on the reasoning that
before marriage a woman has a freedom of choice as to where
she shall be domiciled and which law shall govern her. If she does
not make a pre-nuptial contract to secure her rights, it is assumed
that she is willing to submit to the laws of the intended marital
domicile. After marriage a wife no longer can exercise an option
as to where her domicile will be and what laws shall govern her,
for, except in the instances of divorce, legal or actual separation,
the choice of domicile is now the husband's.29 Thus, the French
reasoned, where there is no pre-nuptial contract the courts will
imply a contract embodying the law of the first marital domicile,
which cannot be displaced or altered by a change either of national
status or of domicile on the part of the husband."0 For example,
25 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra, note , at 343-345.
26 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 426; 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 343-345.
2? For discussion of vested rights see infra.
28 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 417.
29Id. at 418; Beale, The Domicile of a Married Woman, 2 So. L. Q. 93 (1917)
Parks, The Domicil of a Married Woman, 8 MINN. L. REV. 28 (1923).
30 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 345; 1 WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 418.
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a husband and wife were married in England, domiciled there
for some time, and later moved to France where the husband was
naturalized and where he acquired jointly with his wife immov-
able property. The French court held that this property was not
vested in a community of property as it would have been under
French law, but inured solely to the husband, this being the Eng-
lish law which was that of the first matrimonial domicile.
3 1
English courts, on the other hand, have long voiced an opposi-
tion to this continental theory of implied contract. In the famous
case of Lashley v. Hog,2 where the spouses moved from England
to Scotland, it was held that where there is no pre-nuptial con-
tract and a subsequent change of domicile, the rights of the hus-
band and wife to each other's property are governed by the law
of the new domicile, Scotland in this particular instance."
Yet in the DeNicols v. Curlier cases34 the British courts applied
the theory of implied contract. There the husband and wife were
French citizens, domiciled in France, married in Paris, and subject
to the community property system of France. They had not made
a pre-nuptial contract before marriage. Afterwards they acquired
domicile in England, and the husband made a fortune in British
trade, became a British subject, and purchased freehold and lease-
hold lands in England. On the death of the husband the British
court held that the wife's rights to such movables and immovables
were governed by the first matrimonial domicile, namely France,
and the wife was entitled to have a share of the property under the
community property system.
The British courts distinguished Lashley v. Hog and the De-
Nicols cases on the grounds that under French law 5 the failure
31 4 PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 294 (1879).
32 4 Patton (Scotch Appeals Case) 518 (1804).
33 DIcEY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 718, rule 186; RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 355;
STORY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 187.
-4 De Nicols v. Curlier, House of Lords 1899 (1900) Appeal Cases 21 (Concerning
Personal Property) ; De Nicols v. Curlier, 2 Ch. 410 (1900) (Concerning Real Prop-
erty).
35 Articles 1401-1496 of the French Civil Code.
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to make a pre-nuptial contract amounts to the formation of an
express contract for community of property, and thus, had the
case come up before the French court, it would have administered
the law of the first marital domicile. 6 Under British law, a con-
tract operating by force of law is as complete and obligatory as
an express contract and must be given effect on the same footing;
therefore, the British court felt it had no choice but to recognize
the implied contract set up by the first matrimonial domicile. It
must be added that the British court found sufficient evidence that
it was the intention of the parties to be governed by the system of
community property. Lord Brampton, in his judgment stated:
"In the present case, if credit is given to the fourth paragraph of
Mrs. De Nicol's affidavits, their so marrying (i.e. under the system
of community property) was the result of a previous provisional agree-
ment between them that it should be so.
"This," he continues, "is valuable as evidence, if evidence were
needed, that the spouses knew, apart from the ordinary presumption
of knowledge of the law of their own country, what were the legal obli-
gations toward each other they were about to contract regarding their
property, and that they vountarily undertook them with the knowledge
that they would, and with the common intention that they should, be
binding upon them so long as they both lived." 37
Writers on French legal theory have labelled the implied con-
tract as a ficticious assumption, none the less the French courts
still apply the theory and in Switzerland and many Latin Ameri-
can countries, 38 the law of the first domicile actually established
by the husband and wife in common is declared to govern all
future acquisitions of property even after the parties have moved
to a new domicile that has contrary laws or customs.
American writers have bitterly upbraided the British court for
its decision in the DeNicols v. Curlier cases,39 yet, in Canada in
36 DICEY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 719.
31 De Nicols v. Curlier, House of Lords 1899 (1900) Appeal Cases 21, Lord Bramp-
ton's Opinion at p. 44.
88 RAHEi, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 350.
9 Goodrich and Coleman, Pennsylvania Marital Communities and Common Law
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1937 the same result was reached by an Ontario court concerning
property acquired in Ontario by spouses who had moved there
from Quebec. And again the reasoning was founded on the basis
that although the courts of Ontario do not generally imply a con-
tract that the first matrimonial domicile governs, yet, where the
law of the first matrimonial domicile presumes such a contract
operating by force of law, it will be given effect in Ontario courts.
In this instance Quebec's law is based on that of France.40
In the Louisiana case of Saul v. His Creditors,4' the American
court held to Dumoulin's original thesis that the effects of mar-
riage upon property should be determined by the intentions of the
parties, and in order to discover the presumed intentions all facts
of the individual case are taken into consideration. But the Louisi-
ana court flatly rejected the French corollary that where the parties
had made no pre-nuptial contract they have tacitly agreed to sub-
ject themselves to the law of the first marital domicile to all future
acquisitions, even after they have moved to a new domicile having
contrary laws.
The general American view was clearly stated in In Re Majot's
Estate42 which declared that the spouses impliedly contract accord-
ing to the law of the place of their matrimonial domicile as long
as they are in that domicile, but that implied contract does not
govern their after-acquired property when they have subsequently
changed their domicile to a jurisdiction where a contrary law
governs marital property rights. The property acquired in the
new domicile is considered controlled by the law of that jurisdic-
tion in the absence of any express agreement between the spouses.
It cannot be gainsaid that the American rule is the more logical
and the easier to apply, although the French rule has something
Neighbors, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1 (1947) ; Stone, The Law Governing Rights in Prop-
erty Under a Pre-Nuptial Contract, According to the English and American Cases, 13
B. U. L. REV. 219 (1933) ; Neuner, supra, note 2; Harding, supra, note 2; Stumberg,
supra, note 2.
40 Beaudoin v. Tudel, 1 Dom. Law Rep. 216 (Ontario Crt. of App. 1936).
41 Saul v. His Creditors, 5 Mart. (N. S.) 569 (La., 1827).
42 199 N. Y. 29 (1910).
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to recommend it as far as it applies to those establishing a first
marital domicile in a community property area for it would sig-
nify that the democratic institution of community property would
follow the parties wherever they sojourned.
In any event, in Texas, the matter is now governed by statute4'
which provides that, upon moving to Texas, property acquired by
spouses in Texas during the marriage is to be regulated by the
local law. This statute and similar statutes which have been passed
in most community property states are postulated on the ground
that the community porperty laws of the state are real statutes and
not personal statutes, that is they attach to and govern the property
acquired in the state rather than affecting the persons, who may,
as a matter of fact, at the time of the marirage have been domi-
ciled elsewhere and who, after some time, may again remove
their domicile to a common law state.
There is one further rule which has been adopted to determine
the effect of a marriage on the mutual rights of husband and wife
to marital property, that is the nationality test. In a number of
European countries"' the courts have laid down the principle that
the nationality of the husband determines the law which governs
the effects of a marriage on property. Thus, an Italian citizen
migrated to Argentina and was there married and domiciled. The
Italian Supreme court held that the community property laws of
Argentina were inapplicable to this marriage because community
of property was forbidden to Italian nationals by Article 1433 of
the Italian Civil Code of 1865."s There can be no doubt that
British and American courts in such a case would disregard the
Italian Code and apply the law of the domicile - Argentina.
France, too, under its theory of implied contract would ignore the
Italian code and apply community of property.
4- Tzx. REv. CFV. STAT. (Vernon, 1936), Art. 4627.
44 Germany, Bulgaria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Rumania.
45 1 RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 351, sets forth the Italian case, Cass. Roma(April 16, 1932), Foro. Ital. II Massimario, 282 No. 1376.
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IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
In the United States it is an established rule that the law of
the situs governs the interests which one spouse acquires by virtue
of marriage in the immovable property of the other.46 The founda-
tion of this theory is a practical one for ultimately, of course, the
state in which an immovable is located may determine title to prop-
erty lying within its boundaries as it pleases as long as no consti-
tutional principle has been transgressed.47 Therefore when a for-
eign court is called upon to determine property interests in im-
movables situated within a neighbor's domain, it will tread charily,
voicing the face-saving sentiment that each state has exclusive
dominion within its geographic limits, which, in the last analysis,
is but a deferential admittance of the unidealistic realization that
foreign states are unable to enforce decrees in rein which transfer
the title to land outside their own jurisdiction."
This bowing to the inevitable is carried one step farther by the
pronouncement of courts that classification of property, whether it
be considered movable or immovable, personal or real, is also gov-
erned by the law of the state where the property is situated.49 This
was clearly illustrated in the Maryland case of Craig v. Craig"
where the court distinguished only between real and personal prop-
erty, rejecting the classification of movable and immovable. The
court held that a leasehold estate was personal property subject to
the laws of distribution of the domicile of the decedent (Pennsyl-
46 Nott v. Nott, 11 La. 1028, 36 So. 109 (1904) ; Vertner v. Humphreys, 14 Smedes
and M. 130 (Miss. 1850); McCollum v. Smith, Meigs 342, 33 Am. Dec. 147 (Tenn.
1838) ; Heidenheimer v. Loring, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 560, 26 S. W. 99 (1894) ; RESTATE-
MENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 237, 238; DICEY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 588, 597; GooD-
RICH, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 378; Neuner, supra, note 2, at 167, 174.
47 Horowitz, supra, note 2, at 215; Stumberg, supra, note 2, at 65; Note, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 1286, supra, note 2.
48 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 639; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 447
denies application of the full faith and credit clause to anything but a judgment or
decree for payment of money.
49 McCollum v. Smith, Meigs, 342, 33 Am. Dec. 147 (Tenn. 1838) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 227; DICEY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 579.
50 Craig v. Craig, 117 At. 756 (Md. Ct. of App. 1922) ; See also Kneeland v. Ensley,
19 Tenn. 60, 33 Am. Dec. 168 (1838).
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vania), though the land affected by the leasehold was situated in
Maryland. Under the usual legal concept, a leasehold estate is
considered a chattel real subject to the law of the situs.5"
It has been argued52 that under modern conditions there are
three valid reasons for applying the law of the situs in the United
States over and beyond the difficulties inherent in attempting to
gain recognition of decrees in personam as to foreign immovables
under full faith and credit clauses. These three reasons are: (1)
All states have developed some system of recordation with regard
to immovables which can only function if the law of the situs is
applied; (2) those dealing with regard to immovables expect, in
most instances, that the law of the situs will be applicable; and
(3) the enforcement of rights in immovables depends upon the
agencies of the law of the situs, and thus, to simplify matters, this
law must be followed.
Of course, it can be demonstrated that the American view
point leaves much to be desired, for it brings a multiplicity of laws
and regulations into the marital relationship.53 If immovables are
owned by spouses in three or four different states, a different law
applies to each, and each state has the power to determine ques-
tions relating to the effects of that marriage on property. For
example, a husband and wife are married and domiciled in a state
which excludes the wife's separate property from liability for the
husband's debts; the wife owns property in a state which declares
such property is liable for the debts of either spouse. The law of
the situs of the immovable in this case would have a direct eco-
nomic effect on the marriage, and, in contrast to movables as will
be later shown, the law of the situs would formulate a public policy
concerning that marriage.
In many Central European countries the view is maiintained
that the whole marriage relationship should be governed by one
51 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 208, special note; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra,
note 2, at 453; TIFFANY ON REAL PROPERTY, § 72 (3rd ed. 1920).
52 Neuner, supra, note 2, at 168.
53 RABnL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 337; Neuner, supra, note 2, at 175.
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law, i.e. a marital property law." Under this theory all the assets
of the spouses are visualized as forming one part of the estate
and all the debts of the spouses the other-the estate here being
the aggregate whole to be treated by law.
Under the American doctrine of immobilia reguntuur lege loci5"
the point of contact, as one writer indicates:
"... is the immovable itself. The place where the spouses are or where
the assets are managed is irrelevant. This conception implies that no
problem arises other than that of determining the interest of one spouse
in the lands of the other.""
The Central European concept, on the other hand, develops the
inquiry on a broader basis, the courts going into the question of
obligations that may arise between the spouses; the liability of
either to creditors; the effects of voluntary or judicial separation,
divorce; post-nuptial agreements; bankruptcy; the management
of the wife's goods other than those pertaining to her separate
estate; presumptions as to ownership and so on. These factors are
all considered as a part of a complex unit, the estate, which is to
be treated as an aggregate, similar to an inheritance, to which one
conflict rule applies.
Arguments can be mustered for both systems,57 for each con-
tains benefits and each pitfalls. Thus it would be useless to desig-
nate one or the other as the theory to be preferred. If it be conceded
that uniformity of results is one of the most important aims of
law,5" then deviation from the well established principle that all
questions concerning the creation of interests in land in the
United States are governed by the lex rei situs would bring about a
54RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 331.
55 STORY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 158, 186, 188; WHARTON, op. cit. Supra, note 2,
at § 191.
56 RABEL, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 329.
57 Id. at 342.
5sTo those not willing to make this conclusion the authors recommend a perusal of
the following: BEROLZHEIMER, THE WORLD'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES (1912); DEmoruE,
ANALYSIS OF FUNDAMENTAL NOTIONS, MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1916);
KOHLER, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1914); MIRAGLIA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
(1912); VON IHERINc, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (1913).
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chaotic retrogression, obscuring titles, disturbing existing interests,
and harrying courts and legal writers alike in the morass of con-
fusion which would follow a change over to the "estate" concept.
The general benefits, if there be any, from such a legal revolution
would be infinitisimal and far outweighed by the problems which
conversion would give rise to. Thus no American modernist in
legal thought has seriously supported a deviation from the ac-
cepted doctrine that the state in which the an immovable is situated
will determine what, if any, interest one spouse obtains in the
other's land as an incident to marriage.
However, as to most hard and fast rules, there is an exception,
or, to be more accurate, there is a limitation upon the application
of the lex situs in most American jurisdictions, namely, the "re-
placement" or "source" doctrine which declares that immovables
purchased by a spouse with assets which were his separate prop-
erty remain his separate property; and, conversely, when an im-
movable is acquired with community property, it is acquired sub-
ject to the community interest of the other spouse.59 In justifica-
tion of this limitation it is said that title is not lost by moving
assets across state lines and converting them into other forms of
property.
It should be noted here that the "source" or "replacement"
doctrine is purely local law. 0 In reality, it has nothing at all to
do with the law of conflict of laws for it is a part of the domestic
property law of the state in which the transaction occurs. But it
is so closely interwoven with the law of conflict of laws that the
practical result is often almost the same as if the opposing conflict
of laws principle, that the law of the domicile governs all matri-
monial property, had been applied. Therefore, under this doctrine,
the law of the situs is considerably qualified by the operation of
the law of the domicile, and in this single instance, decisions ap-
59 Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 108
Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477, 92 A. L. R. 1347 (1924). In re Wilson's Estate, 56 Nev. 353, 53
P. (2d) 339 (1936).
80 Jacob, The Law of Community Property in Idaho, 1 IDAHO L J. 1, 36 (1931);
Leflar, supra, note 2, at 229.
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proach closely to the European concept of a single marital unit
to which the law of the domicile applies. E.g., a husband and wife
are domiciled in a common law state; the husband purchases
immovables in a community property state with money which he
earned after marriage. Under the common law, this is separate
property, and under the replacement doctrine, the land purchased
therewith remains his separate property.
If, as de Funiak claims,6' the underlying basis for the marital
community property system is the idea of a conjugal partnership,
economic in nature and democratic in origin, the line of reasoning
dictated by the source doctrine in the above illustration, defeats
the spirit of the community property system, for the money with
which the immovable is acquired in this case necesasrily belongs
to one of the spouses as his or her separate property because under
the law of their domicile nothing but separate property exists, and
no acquisition of immovable property can ever become community
property as long as the spouses remain domiciled in a common
law state. It could therefore be justifiably argued that in commu-
nity property states, as far as immovables are concerned, the law
of the suits should prevail in every case62 as a matter of strong
public policy, and the purely local theory involved in the replace-
ment or source doctrine should have no part in internal community
property law.
It is a general rule, 3 however, both in common law and in com-
munity property states, that the character of interest in the new
property is the same as that of the old. Thus, if land is purchased
by one of the spouses with community funds and in his name only,
61 DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra, note 2, at § 11, p. 27.
62 The result was reached in the following community property cases: Gratton v.
Weber, 47 Fed. 852 (C. C., D. Wash., N. D. 1891) ; Smith v. Gloyd, 182 La. 770, 162 So.
617 (1935) ; Rush v. Landes, 107 La. 549, 32 So. 95 (1902).
63 In re Arms' Estate, 186 Cal. 554, 199 Pac. 1053 (1921) ; Kraemer x. Kraemer, 52
Cal. 302 (1877) ; Mayor v. Breeding, 24 S. W. (2d) 542 (Tex. Civ. App.) 1930) ; Thayer
v. Clark, 77 S. W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903), affirmed 81 S. W. 1274; McDaniel v. Har-
ley, 42 S. W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897). See note, 92 A. L. R. 1347, 1352. See cases cited
64 A. L. R. 246 (1929) ; 31 C. J. 28, 37, 72 (1923).
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the interest of the other spouse survives and is technically pro-
tected by means of a resulting or constructive trust.64
In the event that the purchase price of an immovable was paid
for partially from separate funds and partially from community
funds the question becomes mathematically more complicated. In
theory the principle of law should be the same in such a situation,
yet the courts are prone to shy from complex evaluations, and only
if the assets are clearly traceable will they continue to apply the
source doctrine. 5 When separate and community property are
so commingled and confused as to be no longer clearly traceable,
the whole will be deemed community, at least in community prop-
66erty states.
It may be noted that some decisions have created a great in-
consistency in the source doctrine when immovables are con-
verted into movables. For example, a husband and wife are
domiciled in a separate property state and the wife inherits
land situated in a community property state. The land is sold, and
the money thus received is sent into the separate property 'state.
Logically, under the replacement doctrine, the money thus acquired
should be substituted for the land and remain subject to the law
of the situs of the land; but, in a similar situation, a Maryland
court67 evaluated the treatment given the money in such instances
by declaring that conversion from an immovable to a movable
effectuated the application of the law of the domicile to the mov-
able and the husband acquired the money under the rule of the
law of the domicile.
The court stated:
"The mutation from realty to personalty may be determined to be
64 Neuner, supra, note 2, at 172.
65 Succession of Anders, 131 La. 154, 103 So. 623 (1913) ; In re Gulstine's Estate,
166 Wash. 326, 6 P. (2d) 628 (1932) ; Rogers v. Joughin, 152 Wash. 448, 277 Pac. 388
(1929) ; Zintheo v. B. F. Goodrich Rubber Co., 136 Wash. 196, 239 Pac. 391 (1925);
Heintz v. Brown, 46 Wash. 387, 90 Pac. 211, 123 Am. St. Rep. 937 (1907).
66 Estate of Woods, 23 Cal. App. (2d) 187, 72 P. (2d) 258 (1937) ; In re Gulstine's
Estate, 166 Wash. 325, 6 P. (2d) 628 (1932) ; In re Carmock's Estate, 133 Wash. 374,
233 Pac. 942 (1925) ; Jacobs v. Hoitt, 19 Wash. 283, 205 Pac. 414 (1922).
67 Newcomer v. Orem, 2 Md. 297, 56 Am. Dec. 717 (1857).
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complete when the sale is ratified and the purchaser has complied with
the terms of it by paying the money...
"The property having undergone this change, we are of the opinion
that the interest of Mrs. Orem ceased to be governed by the laws of
Louisiana [where the land 'was located] and became subject to those
of their domicile, by virtue of which the husband is the owner of the
wife's choses in action . .."6
The question now arises: which law determines the rights to
the profits and fruits of land? It is axiomatic that profits and fruits
do not necessarily belong to the owner of the land,69 and it must
be emphasized that fruits and profits of an immovable are
movables.
Take the following case: a husband and wife reside in a com-
munity property state; the husband owns a separate farm in a
common law state; on this land he has a house and an orchard; he
obtains rent from the house, sells fruit from the orchard, and
finally disposes of the whole farm for $1,000 more than he origi-
nally paid for it. Do the funds thus acquired remain separate prop-
erty under the replacement doctrine or are they converted into com-
munity pioperty?70
The courts usually declare that the ownership of the income
from land should be determined by the law of the domicile of the
spouses unless, by statute, a different law is applicable.71 Thus,
under Louisiana statutory law, 72 the fruit of the husband's separate
property falls into the community. While, Nevada, on the other
hand," applies the law of the situs of the land and maintains that
income from separate property remains separate property if the
68 Id. at 306.
69 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 51, at § 599.
70 Under Spanish Community property laws, fruits and profits of the spouses' sep.
arate property are community property based on the conception that fruits and income
of all property of each spouse was naturally devoted to the benefit of the marital union.
See DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra, note 2, at § 71, p. 180.
71 Gilkey v. Pollock, 82 Ala. 503, 3 So. 99 (1887).
72 DACGETT, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 143. See LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870 (Merrick's
3rd ed. 1925), articles 2402, 2334, 2386; Peters v. Klein, 161 La. 664, 109 So. 349 (1926).
73 Grimes v. Grimes, 52 F. (2d) 171 (D. Nev. 1931) ; See also, State ex rel. Van
Moss v. Sailors, 39 P. (2d) 397, 180 Wash. 269 (1935).
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immovable is located in a common law state. There are decisions,7 4
compelled by the Texas Constitution,75 that rents and profits of
separate lands in Texas are community property.
When property or money is derived from separate property
without the impairment of the original capital, it seems clearly to
fall within the term "rents and profits," but what of the $1,000
the husband made by selling the farm? The courts, in the majority
of cases,76 have insisted on tracing the unit back to its source,
saying that exchanges of separate property for new property re-
main separate property regardless of profit or loss involved in the
transaction.77 In Texas, where the statute provides that "rents,
issues and profits" of separate property are community property,
"increases of land" are specifically excepted therefrom."
MOVABLES OWNED AT THE TIME OF MARRIAGE
The property rights acquired by the husband and wife in the
pre-nuptial movable property of the other are usually said to be
determined by the law of the husband's domicile at the time of the
marriage in the absence of an express pre-marital contract.79 This
conflict of laws rule with its emphasis on domiciliary law is ob-
74 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Terry, 69 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) ;
Robbins v. Robbins, 125 S. W. (2d) 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) ; Frame v. Frame, 120
Tex. 61, 36 S. W. (2d) 152, 73 A. L. R. 1512 (1931). It was held here that a statute
declaring rents and revenues derived from a wife's separate real estate to be her sep-
arate property violated the Texas constitutional provision declaring what constitutes
wife's separate property.
,
5 TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1936), Art. 16, § 15.
'6 Gump v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 F. (2d) 540 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942).
In re Buchanan's Estate, 89 Wash. 172, 154 Pac. 129 (1916); Jacobs, supra, note 60,
at 46.
77 But see Beals v. Fontenot, 111 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) decided under
LA. CIVIL CODE 1870, § 2408, declaring that where separate property of either spouse
increased during marriage the other spouse should be entitled to one-half of the increase
if it proved that the increase is the result of common labor or industry, but not if it is
due only to the ordinary course of things such as the rise in the value of property or the
chances of trade.
78 TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1936), Arts. 4613, 4614.
79 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 289 (1934); 2 BF.ALE, THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, § 289.1 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS, 382 (1949); STUMBEC, CON-
FLICT OF LAWS, 285 (1937) ; Harding, supra, note 2; Horowitz, supra, note 2; Leflar,
supra, note 2; Note, Marital Property and the Conflict of Laws, supra, note 2.
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viously an outgrowth of the ancient maxim, mobilia sequuntur
personam, which was developed in medieval times when mankind
travelled little with the result that man and his property were
usually located at the same place, the owner's domicile. Hence, it
was assumed that movables had no location apart from their owner,
no situs of their own, and since they and the owner were in most
instances located at the owner's domicile, the domiciliary law was
held controlling in the creation of rights in personal property."0
Today, by reason of modern travel as well as because of the
fact that property is often owned in more than one state, the
thought that tangible movables may not have a situs of their own
is mere fiction. With respect to title or interests in movable prop-
erty resulting from transactions inter vivos, the maxim that mov-
ables follow the person has been rejected as unrealistic, and the
law of the domicile has given way to the law of the situs of the
movable."1 Nevertheless, the old maxim lingers on as the weight of
authority in cases where matrimonial porperty rights are at bar
and also in cases concerning devolution of personal property at
death, the distribution of property on testate or intestate suc-
cession."
Returning to marital property rights arising in the spouses at
the time of the marriage, the law of the place of performance of
the marriage is held not controlling inasmuch as the place of cele-
bration may be purely happenstance. 3 Thus, the issue as to the
applicable law becomes a conflict between the law of the situs and
8" See STORY, Op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 376, 377, 379.
st BEALE, op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 255.2, 255.5-259.1; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra,
note 2, at 470; STtIMBERC, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 357. THE RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS
OF LAWS, §§ 255, 256, 257 and 258, states that capacity to make a valid conveyance of
a chattel, the formalities of such conveyance, the substantial validity of such convey-
ance and the nature of the intcret created by a conveyance are all to be determined by
the law of the place where the chattel is at the time of conveyance. See also Carnahan,
Tan.girIe Property and Conflict of Laws, 2 U. OF CM. L. REv. 345 (1935).
S RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 303 and 306; GOODRICH, Op. cit. supra,
note 2, at 501 and 512; STUMBER, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 378-386.
s.3 Allen v. Allen, 6 Rob. 104, 39 Am. Dec. 553 (La. 1843) ; Land v. Land, 22 Miss.
99 (,8,-'0) ; Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279, 51 Am. Rep. 17 (1884), RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 289, comment a; Harding, supra, note 2, at 865; Note 43 HARv.
L. REv., supra, note 2, at 1287.
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the domiciliary law. Since it is now recognized that movables may
have a situs of their own, it can be contended that the law of the
situs of the movable should be the applicable law to determine
the interests of the husband and wife in pre-marital movables. The
state wherein the res is located may ignore the law of the domicile
and apply its own law if it so desires since it has control over the
res.8 4 Even so, the courts of the situs, have, in the majority of
instances, adopted the usual conflict of laws rule and have re-
ferred the question of the interests of the spouses in movables
owned at the time of the marriage to the domiciliary law.
It is within the realm of possibility that a court at the situs of
the res will concede that the law of the domicile should govern,
but then will refuse to give effect to the foreign law because in the
particular case and on the particular facts at bar, it would be con-
trary to the public policy of the state. 5
To refer the interests of the spouses arising in each other's
movables at the time of marriage to the domicilary law may be
justified on the grounds of convenience. It is argued in this respect
that marital property rights should be determined as a single unit
with one law applicable. 6 It often occurs that the movable prop-
erty of the spouses is scattered in many states at the time the mar-
riage is performed. To apply the law of the situs wherein each
piece of movable property was located would mean the application
of numerous laws, and it could happen that the interest of the
spouses in each and every movable would therefore be governed
by a different law. To apply a single law, that of the domicile, to
all the personal estate is more convenient and far simpler. 7
Although modern writers are in accord with the rule stated
above, to the effect that rights of the spouses in their respective pre-
marital movables are to be referred to the law of the husband's
84 Leflar, supra, note 2, at 225.
85 Ibid; See Locke v. McPherson, 263 Mo. 493, 638 S. W. 726, 52 L. R. A. 420 (1901).
86 See supra.
87 Leflar, supra, note 2, at 225; Horowitz, supra, note 2, at 218; Note, 43 HARv. L. REv.
supra, note 2, at 1286.
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domicile,"8 the courts and earlier writers usually couch their
theories in the term "matrimonial domicile"8 9 rather than "hus-
band's domicile." For example in the case of Harral v. Harral°
the court said:
"The authorities are quite generally in accord in selecting the matri-
monial domicile as the place which shall furnish the law regulating
the interests of husband and wife in the movable property of either
which was in esse when the marriage took place." '
This opinion then went on to add that by matrimonial domicile
was meant the husband's domicile. It was stated:
"On the marriage, the legal presumption is that the wife takes the domi-
cile of her husband, and her rights are subject to the laws of his domi-
cile.'o-
2
In spite of this language and similar expressions by other courts,
there is some difference of opinion as to whether "matrimonial
domicile" is always to be placed at the husband's domicile at the
time of marriage in order to determine marital ownership of pre-
nuptial movables. In the majority of cases the spouses are both
domiciled in the same state at the time of marriage with no inten-
tion of removing therefrom. Here then there could be no question
but that such state would be considered the matrimonial domicile.
But suppose the parties are domiciled in different states at the time
of marriage and intend to make the domicile of the wife their home
after marriage; or suppose the husband and wife intend to fix their
domicile in still a third state after marriage. In these latter in-
stances would the husband's domicile at the time of marriage be
88 See authorities cited in note 79, supra.
8 Arendell v. Arendell, 10 La. Ann. 566 (1855); Allen v. Allen, 6 Rob. 104 (La.
1843) ; Ford v. Ford, 2 Mart. (N. S.) (La. 1824) ; Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279,
51 Am. Rep. 17 (1884); Kneeland v. Ensley, 19 Tenn. 620 (Meigs 1838) ; State v. Bar-
row, 14 Tex. 179 (1855) ; McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex. 187 (1849) ; See STORY, Op. cit.
supra, note 2, at § 186.(3) ; WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at § 190; Notes, 57 L. R.
A. 352 (1903) and 85 Am. St. Rep. 552 (1901).
9039 N. J. Eq. 279, 51 Am. Rep. 17 (1884).
91 Id. at 288.
92Ibid.
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considered the matrimonial domicile whose law should govern the
property interests of the husband and wife at that time?
Story in his treatise would answer the question in the negative:
"But suppose a man domiciled in Massachusetts should marry a lady
domiciled in Louisiana, what is then to be- deemed the matrimonial
domicile? Foreign jurists would answer that it is the domicile of the
husband, if the intention of the parties is to fix their residence there;
and of the wife, if the intention is to fix their residence there; and
if the residence is intended to be in some other place, as in New York,
then the matrimonial domicile would be in New York."93
By this rule then, the matrimonial domicile by which pre-marital
rights in movables are to be determined would not necessarily be
that of the husband's domicile at the time of marriage, but rather
that intended by the parties, or, as the rule was finally formulated:
"The question as to what place is to be regarded as the matrimonial
domicile, the law of which will determine the effect of the marriage
upon personal property owned by either party at the time, or subse-
quently acquired by either or both during the existence of such domi-
cile, is, in its last analysis, one of intention of the parties at the time
of the marriage as to where they shall establish residence, assuming
that such intention is carried out within a reasonable time." 94(Italics
supplied.)
The courts do often give notice to Story's intention rule in re-
solving the issue of matrimonial domicile. However, upon exam-
ination of the facts of such cases, it will usually be found that the
intended domicile and the domicile of the husband are one and
the same. 5 Hence, under such facts, the outcome is identical no
matter which doctrine is applied.
In the early Texas case, McIntyre v. Chappel,9" the intended
93 STORY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at § 194.
94Note, 57 L. R. A. 352, at 360 n. (1903).
95See Jaffray v. McGough, 83 Ala. 202, 3 So. 594 (1888); Mason v. Fuller, 36 Conn.
160 (1869); Harral v. Harral, 39 N. J. Eq. 279, 51 Am. Rep. 17 (1884); Layne v.
Pardee, 2 Swan 232 (Tenn., 1852), and others collected in 57 L. R. A. 352 (1903) ; See
Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile, 27 YALE L. J. 49, 53-54 (1917).
96 4 Tex. 187 (1849).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
domicile of the spouses and the husband's domicile at the time of
marriage did not coincide. The court held the matrimonial domi-
cile to be that of the husband's domicile at the time of marriage
(Tennessee) until the parties arrived at their intended domicile
(Texas). The court said:
"The national domicile of these parties was, we think, unquestionably
in the state of Tennessee; and we are aware of no principle which,
under the circumstances, would justify the conclusion that their matri-
monial domicile was elsewhere.... We conclude that the matrimonial
domicile of the parties to this marriage was in the state of Tennessee,
and that, previous to the acquisition of a domicile, facto et animo, by
the husband in this country, the laws of that State must furnish the rule
of decision as to their rights." '97
However a later Texas case, State v. Barrow," casts some doubt
upon the McIntyre decision and muddies the water, for there the
court held that where the parties intended to make their domicile
in Texas, but had not yet reached the state and had acquired mov-
ables en route, the Texas law governed as to the marital interests
in these movables.99 The case seems to be out of line with current
notions as to what goes to make up domicile."'
Story, in setting forth the intention thesis, was influenced by
continental writers and Louisiana decisions.'0 ' He reasoned in
90 Id. at 197.
9s 14 Tex. 179 (1855).
19 In the Barrow case the husband and wife were domiciled in Mississippi. They
determined to remove to Texas and while in transit visited in Tennessee where the
wife's father gave to her a slave. Thereafter, they continued their journey to Texas and
resided in the latter state unti! the husband died. Thereupon a creditor sought to levy
on the slave as the property of the husband. The wife claimed the slave as her separate
property. Under both the laws of Texas and Mississippi, the slave was recognized as the
wife's separate property. Under Tennessee law, the slave would have become the prop-
erty of the husband. The court said the question was whether Tennessee or Texas law
governed as to marital rights in the slave and concluded that Texas law governed
because husband and wife intended to make Texas their domicile and looked to the
laws of Texas, as their future domicile, to control. The court did recognize that there
would be more reason to apply Mississippi law (the result would have been same under
Mississippi or Texas law, i.e., the slave would have been adjudged the separate prop-
erty of the wife) under doctrine of domicile to the effect that Mississippi domicile
would have been retained until the new domicile-Texas, acquired.
100 Harding, supra, note 2, at 866-867.
101 STORY, op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199. The two cases
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accord with a civil law viewpoint that marriage was a contract.
Since the spouses could expressly contract as to their marital
property rights, Story believed that, in the absence of such an
express contract, the husband and wife impliedly or tacitly agreed
that their marital interests in property should be determined by
reference to the law of the matrimonial domicile. According to
Story, the interpretation of a contract is governed by the law of
the place of performance." 2 If marriage is a contract, contract
principles must be applied. Therefore the domicile intended by the
parties, i.e., the place where they are going to live, will be the
place of performance. The matrimonial domicile discovered from
the intent of the parties is the place of performance, and is thus
controlling.
Viewing marriage as a contract has been criticized as not in
accord with the common law conception of marriage which treats
it as a status.' Under the common law, the marriage relationship
is said to be entered as a contract, but once entered, the rights and
duties of the relationship are not subject to the wills or consent of
the parties but are prescribed by law. Marital rights in property
arise not by implied contract, but the interests are created by law.
Moreover to say that spouses tacitly contract as to marital inter-
ests in property in accord with the law of a certain jurisdiction
rests upon a proposition that the parties are acquainted with the
law and thus consent to its application, which, it has been said,
can hardly state the fact." 4
The intention rule also conflicts with the general doctrine of
domicile. Two operative facts are said to be necessary in order
to establish a domicile of choice: (1) physical presence in the
were: Le Breton v. Nouchet, 3 Mart. 60, 5 Am. Dec. 736 (La. 1813) ; Ford's curator v.
Ford, 2 Mart. (N. S.) 574, 14 Am. Dec. 201 (La. 1824). It would seem that in both
cases, the husband's domicile and the intended domicile were the same.
102 STORY, Op. cit. supra, note 2, at § 199, states: "... for in England as well as in
America, in the interpretation of other contracts, the law of the place where they are
to be performed has been held to govern."
103 See Harding, supra, note 2, at 859-863, wherein he exposes the fallacy of Story's
reasoning as applicable to common law theory.
104 Goodrich, supra, note 95, at 58.
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place where the domicile is to be acquired, and (2) the intention
to make that place the home."0 5 To acquire a domicile of choice,
these two elements, presence and intention, must be proven.
Story's rule seems to permit the matrimonial domicile to be
established by mere intent alone in a fact situation where neither
the husband nor wife is present or domiciled in the intended domi-
cile at the time of marriage." 6 Perhaps this is not a fundamental
objection inasmuch as the authorities have concluded that intention
alone cannot establish domicile so Story's intention rule has been
qualified by a statement that the intention of the parties govern
* . assuming that such intention is carried out within a reason-
able time."10 7
Apparently, then a matrimonial domicile is not established until
the spouses are present within the intended state of domicile and
this presence must be accomplished within a reasonable time. Yet,
this too, is open to objection for if neither spouse is domiciled at
the time of marriage in the state of intended domicile their marital
rights in property are held in abeyance until their intention is car-
ried out, thus making for uncertainty with respect to important
interests.108
In the face of these obstacles there seems to be no reason to
depart from the common law rule to the effect that upon marriage
the wife's domicile becomes, by operation of law, that of the hus-
band and so continues unless she is justifiably separated from
him.1"' Although the cases do give lip service to the term "matri-
monial domicile" in reality it would appear that controlling weight
is given to the husband's domicile at the time of the marriage in
deciding which law governs the interests acquired by each spouse
in the pre-nuptial movable property of the other. Thus matrimonial
105 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 15; STUMBERc, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 18.
106 Goodrich, supra, note 95, at 51; Harding, supra, note 2, at 863.864.
107 See note 94, supra.
108 Goodrich, supra, note 95, at 51; Harding, supra, note 2, at 864; STUMBERG, supra,
note 2, at 56.
109 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 27, 28; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at 38-42.
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domicile actually means husband's domicile. The Restatement
takes this position when it declares:
"At marriage the husband and wife respectively acquire such rights
or other interests in movables then belonging to the other as are given
by the law of the domicil of the husband at the time of the marriage."
' 1 0
Considering this rule from the standpoint of a functional ap-
proach, can the application of the law of the husband's domicile
in this situation be justified?'.. The trend of modern day thought
is to the effect that property owned by the spouses prior to the
marriage should remain the separate property of the spouses after
the marriage. Thus, if the law of the husband's domicile followed
the old common law doctrine which gave the wife's pre-marital
movables to the husband, or if the law of the husband's domicile
made such movables part of the community estate,"' hardship
would be suffered by the wife. However, such rules have now been
abrogated in American jurisdictions and, in so far as the conflict
of laws rules applicable to determine the interests each spouse
gains in the movable property of the other at marriage, the matter
is of little import.
With respect to ante-nuptial property, the law, as modified, states
that such property of either party remains the separate property
of that party after the marriage. Therefore, it matters but little
whether the law of the situs, the law of the intended domicile, or
the law of the husband's domicile is held controlling, for under
all the pre-marital property is considered to be the separate prop-
erty of the spouse owning it at the time of marriage."'
MOVABLES ACQUIRED AFTER MARRIAGE
That the law of the husband's domicile at the time of the acqui-
sition determines the mutual rights of the husband and wife in
110 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 289. See authorities cited supra, note 79,
accepting this viewpoint.
111 See Horowitz, supra, note 2, for an excellent exposition of this approach.
112 In Roman-Dutch law, all property of spouses owned at the time of marriage
becomes community property. DE FUNrAK, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 1.
113 Id. at § 89.
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post-nuptial movables is the proposition accepted by the weight of
American authority in the absence of an express contract to the
contrary." 4 Thus, as to movable property acquired after the mar-
riage at a time when the husband's domicile at marriage is un-
changed, the law of that domicile governs the spouses' interests.
On the other hand, if the husband's domicile is changed after
marriage, the law of the husband's domicile at the time the mov-
able property is acquired will be determining with respect to mari-
tal interests in that property. In short, the actual domicile of the
spouses at the time of acquisition of the movable is controlling."' l
This doctrine has evolved in American jurisdictions through a
rejection of the rule of implied contracts' 16' i.e., that parties upon
marriage impliedly contract with reference to marital rights in
property according to the law of the matrimonial domicile at the
time of marriage, and that such an implied agreement will bring
into operation the law of the first matrimonial domicile as to all
future acquisitions even though acquired after the parties have
established a new domicile. In an early leading case, Saul v. His
Creditors,"7 the court refused to follow the theory of implied con-
tract and decided that the interest of the spouses in property
acquired after removal to Louisiana would be governed by the
community property laws of Louisiana and would not be the sep-
arate property of the husband as would have been the case under
Virginia law, the place where the parties were domiciled at the
time of marriage.
114 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 290; Shelkret v. Helvering, 138 F. (2d) 925
(App. D. C. 1943) ; Ellington v. Harris, 127 Ca. 85, 56 S. E. 134 (1906) ; Matter of
Majot, 199 N. Y. 29, 92 N. E. 402 (1910) ; Powell v. De Blane, 23 Tex. 661 (1859) ;
Castro v. lilies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858) ; BEALE, Op. cit. supra, note 2, at 1013; STUMBERC,
op. cit. supra, note 2, at 286-287; Goodrich and Coleman, supra, note 39, at 6-7; Horo-
witz, supra, note 2, at 215; Leflar, supra, note 2, at 230-236.
'ri1 The Restatemcnt of Conflict of Laws is stated in terms of the law of the domicile
of the parties as controlling. This is taken to be the husband's domicile if the parties
have not eztablishcd separate domicile. Where the spouses have separate domiciles at
the time of acquisition, it is stated that: ".. . the law of the domicile of that spouse who
acquires the movables determines the extent of the interest of the other spouse therein."§ 290, comment c.
116 See section on implied contracts, supra.
117 5 Mart. (N. S.) 569, 16 Am. Dec. 212 (La. 1827).
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In rejecting the implied contract theory, the choice of law to be
followed in determining marital interests in acquisitions of mov-
able property subsequent to marriage has been narrowed to the
law of the situs or alternatively, to that of the husband's domicile
at the time of the acquisition of the property in question.
As stated, the application of a domiciliary law may be traced
back to the mobilia doctrine, a fiction which has ceased to be ap-
plied in cases of inter vivos transfers of tangible personality since
the recoginition has come about of the irrefutable fact that a tang-
ible movable may have a location of its own. Therefore the rule
has generally been accepted that the law of the situs at the time
a chattel is acquired is the applicable law in transactions inter
vivos, and there is also some authority for a situs rule with respect
to marital interests in movables acquired subsequent to the mar-
riage. However, the domiciliary rule has now prevailed in the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, although an original proposed
draft, published prior to the Restatement, acepted the situs rule in
the following words:
"An interest in movables acquired by either or both of the spouses
during coverture is in one or the other, or both, according to the law
of the place where the movables are situated when [they were]
acquired.'11s
The law of the situs does have final control over all property
situated within its boundaries, and thus may refer the question of
marital interests to domiciliary law or may apply its own law.
This control of the situs state is exemplified by the fact that cer-
tain states have enacted statutes to the effect that the law of the
state shall determine marital interests in all property acquired in
the state. Article 2400 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides:
118 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS, Proposed Final Draft No. 2,
§ 311 (1931) ; Harding, supra, note 2, favors a situs rule because the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam today states but a fiction; because a reference to domicilary law
arises out of a contract theory as to marriage and such is unacceptable in common law
jurisdictions; and further by an application of a domicilary rule, one state by its law is
permitted to pass title to movables located in another which goes against notions of jur-
isdiction.
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"All property acquired in this State by nonresident married persons...
shall be subject to the same provisions of law which regulate the com-
munity of acquests and gains between citizens of this State.""'
The control of the situs is also illustrated by cases such as
Smith v. McAtee.20 where, in the absence of legislation similar to
that illustrated above, the courts of a situs state refused to refer
the question of marital interests to the law of the domicile because
of a strong public policy of the state in the particular case which
precluded such reference. 1'
In most instances the state of the domicile and the situs are the
same, so the question does not become a vital issue, though the
courts do usually cite the domiciliary law as governing interests
in movables acquired after marriage. The problem of the choice of
law becomes acute in instances where the domicile and situs do
not coincide, and here the weight of authority again cites the
domiciliary law with approval.'22
As in the case of the application of the domiciliary law to mov-
ables owned prior to the marriage, the convenience of a domicilary
rule is strongly contended to be of overruling weight in controlling
marital interests in post-nuptial movables inasmuch as it makes
for greater simplicity to have one single uniform law determine
119 2 LA. CIVIL CODE (2nd ed. 1932) ; See DACGETT, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 109-113,
for a discussion of Article 2400. Texas has not gone as far as Louisiana. TEx. REv. CIV.
STAT. (' ernon, 1948), Art. 4627 states: "The marital rights of persons married in other
countries who may remove to this state shall, in regard to property acquired in this
state, during the marriage, be regulated by the laws of this state."
12127 Md. 420, 92 Am. Dec. 641 (1867).
121 In Smith v. McAtee, creditors of the husband sought to attach in Maryland pro-
ceeds of realty devised to the wife. By the law of domicile, Illinois, such proceeds
become property of the husband, but in Maryland they were protected by statute from
the debts of the husband. The Maryland court refused to permit the attachment. It
seemed to be applying local public policy for the protection of married women in refus-
ing to app'y the general domicilary rule. Shumway v. Leakey, 67 Cal. 458, 8 Pac. 12
(1885), and Gooding Mill & Elevator Co. v. Lincoln Bank, 22 Idaho 468, 126 Pac. 777
(1912), also apply situs law; however, other reasons were present to influence the deci-
sio .-, e.g., in the Gooding case, estoppel was relied upon and in the Shumway case, the
laws of Nevada, the situs, were presumed to be the same as those of the forum.
122 Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168, 25 So. 806 (1899) ; Nelson
v. Goree's Administrator, 34 Ala. 565 (1859) ; Hicks v. Pope, 8 La. 554 (1835) ; McLean
v. Hardin. 3 Jones Eq. (56 N. C. 283) 294 (1857) ; Snyder v. Stringer, 116 Wash. 131,
198 Pac. 733 (1921) ; Cope v. Lindbloom, 57 Wash. 106, 106 Pac. 634 (1910).
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the interests of the spouses in the entire movable estate. A situs
rule, on the other hand, would call for a consideration of many
laws, i.e., the laws of the states of the situs at the time of the acqui-
sition in instances where tangible movables are acquired in differ-
ent states. Further justification for the domicilary rule lies in the
fact that there is a tendency to collect all movable property at
one place, even though acquired elsewhere, and, since disputes
pertaining to the interests of the spouses arising at the time of the
dissolution of the marriage generally occur at the domicile, all
parties concerned will have greater knowledge of the domicilary
law.12
3
The argument advanced in favor of the domicilary law, that
of having single uniform regime applicable to the whole movable
estate, loses some force when consideration is taken of the fact
that marital interests in movables acquired in every new domicile
will be governed by a different law since the marital interests in
post-nuptial movables are to be determined by the law of the actual
domicile at the time of acquisition. It has been suggested however,
in answer to this criticism, that during the course of the marriage
there will, in all probability, be fewer changes of domicile than
acquisition of property in different locations. 12 In order to have a
single law always controlling as to marital ownership, it would
be necessary to accept the view of French jurists that where there
is no express contract at the time of marriage governing the respec-
tive property rights of the spouses in presently owned property or
property to be acquired in the future, the law of the first matri-
monial domicile governs throughout the whole of the marital rela-
tionship, irrespective of where the parties later acquire domicile
or the laws of the after-acquired domicile.
The inconvenience to the state of the situs in being forced to
apply rules of law of other jurisdictions and the fact that the
interests of bona fide third persons who place reliance upon the
appearance of the property being subject to the marital interests
123 Horowitz, supra, note 2, at 218-219; Leflar, supra, note 2, at 233-234.
124 Leflar, supra, note 2, at 234, n. 51.
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defined by the place where such property is located, have been
advanced as reasons to militate against the rule of domicile. With
respect to the inconvenience argument, it can be rejected on the
grounds that the situs state, in most cases, will still be forced to
look to the law of another state, the domicile, for movables will
probably be purchased with property acquired in the state of domi-
cile, and, under the "source" or "replacement" doctrine, the com-
munity or separate interests of the spouses, as the case may be,
will be retained and reappear in the movable acquired. To the
state of the situs this would be equally inconvenient. Moreover,
in any event, inconvenience to the situs state would he offset by
the greater inconvenience to the state of domicile where, in all
likelihood, the movable will be taken after purchase inasmuch as
the state of domicile would be forced to look to many laws if the
movables are acquired in more than one state when the issue of
matrimonial interests in marital property are at stake.1
25
A. situs rule will not afford complete protection to the interests
of bona fide creditors or purchasers either. It is true that creditors
and purchasers and other innocent third parties may expect the
law of the place where the property is located to govern, but the
situs rule declares that the interest of the spouses are determined
by the Jaw of the place where acquired. It is not beyond the realm
of possibility that movables acquired in one state may be moved to
Iic:!er, not necessarily the domicile of the spouses. In such in-
stance if the situs theory were applied the law of the original situs
of acquisition would control the husband's and wife's interests,
and bona fide third parties relying on the law where the property
is presently situated would be no better off and would be subject
to the danger of having their interests defeated by the law of the
situs where acquired. It has been stated that, to protect the interests
of bona fide third persons, each state should enact such legisla-
tion as it deems necessary.' 26
If, as in a community property jurisdiction, it is recognized that
125 Id. at 235.
"' Ibid.; Horowitz, supra, note 2, at 217; note, 43 HARV. L. REV., supra, note 2.
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a husband and wife share a joint ownership or partnership inter-
est in the fund which they acquired by their common labor dur-
ing coverture, then an automatic reference to either a situs law or
to the law of the husband's domicile will at times deprive the wife
of her joint interest. For example, if the property is acquired in a
common law state where it is considered the separate property of
the husband, the parties being domiciled at the time in a commu-
nity property jurisdiction, and community funds are used to acquire
the property, the court, if it determines to apply the law of the situs
and ignores the source doctrine, may not preserve the partnership
interests.127 On the other hand, if the parties are domiciled in a
common law state and property is acquired in a community prop-
erty state, should the court look to the domicilary law, once again
the partnership interest will not be retained. Thus, proceeding with
reference to a functional viewpoint, it has been said that, as to
movable property acquired by the joint efforts of the husband and
wife during the conjugal association, the law of any jurisdiction
should be applied which tends to uphold the partnership interests
of the husband and wife and with which the movables have some
substantial connection. 2 '
CHANGE OF DOMICILE AND REMOVAL OF PROPERTY TO
ANOTHER STATE
Rights in pre-marital movables are determined by the law of
the matrimonial domicile at the time of marriage, and the spouses
interests in movables acquired subsequent to the marriage are to
be determined by the law of the matrimonial domicile at the time
of acquisition. In either instance the matrimonial domicile signifies
the husband's domicile. Suppose now that the spouses at the time
of marriage own movable property and the husband's domicile
is in a community property state; then, subsequent to the mar-
127 This is not true if the source or replacement doctrine is applied, for if commu-
nity property is used to acquire other property the interests of the husband and wife
will be retained by application of the source doctrine through creation of a resulting or
constructive trust.
128 See Horowitz, supra, note 2, for a discussion of the functional approach.
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riage, additional movable property is acquired at the husband's
domicile in this community property state. Thereafter the domicile
is changed and the property removed to a state where community
property laws do not prevail. Or, carrying the hypothesis another
step, suppose, in the first instance the spouses are domiciled in a
common law state where the property in question is the separate
property of the husband, and later the spouses remove the prop-
erty and change their domicile to a community porperty state. In
the first hypothetical case, does the property upon removal and
change of domicile become the separate property of the hus-
band? Or, in the second, does the character of ownership change
so that the property is now held subject to a community of interests
according to the community property law of the latter state?
The answer in each instance is in the negative. This is somewhat
surprising in view of the American theory to the effect that when
spouses change their domicile there is also a change in the system
of laws governing marital interests in movables. With the rejec-
tion of the implied contract rule, that the law of the original matri-
monial domicile governs the entire marital interests permanently,
it was held that if the domicile were changed the law of the new
matrimonial domicile became applicable to determine the marital
interests of husband and wife. Nevertheless this doctrine has been
abridged by another. It is well settled in the United States that
only movables acquired after a change of domicile are governed
by the law of the new domicile, and interests acquired under the
law of one domicile are not affected by the law of a later domicile.
Vested marital interests existing prior to a removal of the prop-
erty or change of domicile are not divested by either such re-
moval or change of domicile or both.'29
This doctrine has been protected by constitutional dogma as
129 Stephen v. Stephen, 36 Ariz. 235, 284 Pac. 158 (1930) ; In re Thornton's Estate,
1 Cal. (2d) 1, 33 P. (2d) 1, 92 A. L. R. 1343 (1934) ; Kraemer v. Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302(1877) ; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 126 Pac. 772 (1912) ; Popp's Succession,
146 La. 464, 83 So. 765 (1919) ; Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. (1848);
Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, 233 Pac. 477 (1924) ; Bosma v. Harden, 94 Ore. 219,
185 Pac. 741 (1919) ; Thayer v. Clark, 77 S. W. 1050 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903); Blethen
v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App.*583; 71 S. W. 290 (1902); McDaniel v. Harley, 42 S. W.
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illustrated by the case of In re Thornton's Estate."' In that case the
poperty involved had been acquired while the spouses were domi-
ciled in Montana, where it was the separate property of the hus-
band subject to the wife's right of dower. Subsequently the domi-
cile was changed to California and the property removed to that
state. The husband died domiciled in California, and by the terms
of his will disposed of all the property as his separate property.
The widow sought to have one-half of the property distributed to
her as community property upon the theory that the Montana
property had been converted into community property, in accord-
ance with a California statute, when the change of domicile was
effected. The court said:
"The basic question is that of the constitutionality of so much of section
164 of the Civil Code as provides that all other property. . .' acquired
after marriage by either husband or wife or both, including .. .per-
sonal property wherever situated, heretofore or hereafter acquired
while domiciled elsewhere, which would not have been the separate
property of either if acquired while domiciled in this state, is com-
munity property...' ,"s"
The court then held that this section of the code could not inter-
fere with rights vested under the law of some other state, and in
attempting to do so the statute was unconstitutional. Therefore, the
husband was permited to dispose of the estate as his sole and
separate property.
If the state of new domicile or the state to which the property
is removed seeks to divest interests already vested such divest-
ment will apparently be held to violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.132 Only property acquired at the
new domicile partakes of its law governing marital interests.
323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422 (1874) ; Brookman v.
Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 291;
BEALE, op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 292.1 and 292.2; GOODRICH, op. c't. supra, note 2, at
§ 124; STUMBERC, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 288; Horowitz, supra, note 2. at 220-225; Leflar,
supra, note 2, at 225-230, 236-238.
130 1 Cal. (2d) 1, 33 P. (2d) 1 (1934).
13, Ibid.
132 Two provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment were said to be violated. The court
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This rule does not always make for beneficial results, for certain
important consequences or incidents of ownership may be lost by
its application inasmuch as only vested rights come within the
constitutional orbit. For example, consider an instance where the
spouses have maintained their matrimonial domicile in a state
where the common law system of separate property is in being
wherein they have accumulated, by their common efforts during
coverture, property, real and personal, and subsequently they
remove to a community property state selling all property and
taking the proceeds with them. Under the law of the first state
the wife would have a dower interest in the proceeds and a widow's
share in the personal property at the time of the death of the hus-
band. Assume that shortly after they establish a new domicile in
the community property jurisdiction, the husband dies intestate.
Dower is not a part of the community porperty system, and the
wife would therefore lose all her dower interests .133 The widow
would only receive a portion of the separate property of the hus-
band as prescribed by the laws of descent and distribution of the
last domicile. Ordinarily a wife's interest in a community prop-
erty state are protected by her half of the community property;
therefore, her share of the husband's separate property might con-
ceivably be smaller than in a separate property state where she
does not obtain a half interest in all property which is a fruit of
joint efforts. Thus, the widow would possibly receive a smaller
share than she would have obtained if the change of domicile had
not been made, and more drastically still, if the parties had re-
moved to Louisiana she would obtain no share at all if there were
stated: "If the right of a husabnd, a citizen of California, as to his separate property, is
a vested one and may not be impaired or taken by California law, then to disturb in the
same manner the same property right of a citizen of another state, who chances to trans-
fer his domicile to this state, bringing his property with him, is clearly to abridge the
privileges and immunities of the citizen. Again, to take the property of A and transfer
it to B because of his citizenship and domicile, is also to take his property without due
process of law." Id. at 3.
133 A widow's right to dower is said to be determined by the law of the situs of the
land. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 248 (1).
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heirs."' To recapitulate, under the vested rights theory the widow
does not receive half of the property as it is not community prop-
erty, but the separate property of the husband which vested ac-
cording to the laws of the former matrimonial domicile where
acquired. She receives only a share of the husband's personal
property according to the laws of descent and distribution of the
last domicile of the deceased, for the rights of the spouses to share
in the distribution of the other's personal estate at the time of
death are not vested rights but mere expectancies to be determined
by the laws as to devolution of estates of the domicile at death. 3 '
The difficulty, as can be readily discerned, is that in community
property states, the wife's interests are protected in the community
acquests and gains by the law whcih gives her a one-half owner-
ship. The laws in community property areas pertaining to separate
property and the wife's share in such are made with reference to
property which is not a product of joint marital effort, but rather
property owned or acquired by one of the spouses prior to mar-
riage, or through gift or inheritance. Thus, in a situation where
the spouses move from a separate property state to a community
property state taking with them the proceeds of property acquired
through their joint effort, the community property state, under the
vested rights theory which recognizes this property as separate
property of the husband applies rules of the state applicable to
property not acquired by joint efforts but rules applicable to
property acquired prior to the marriage or by gift or inheritance. 1 6
A more just result would be reached by upholding the consti-
tutionality of a statute, such as that of California in the Thornton
case, which would give the wife, upon the spouses' removal to a
community property state, a community interest in her husband's
134 LA. CIVIL CODE OF 1870, Art. 924; for Texas rule, see TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Ver-
non, 1948), Art. 2571.
135 See WHARTON, op. cit. supra, note 2, at §§ 193 and 193(a) ; Horowitz, supra, note
2, at 221-22; Leflar, supra, note 2, at 226-228; Neuner, supra, note 2, at 176-178. Some
other examples of consequences or incidents of ownership which receive no constitu-
tional protection are: exemption from attachment, curtesy, homestead, and character of
property whether real or personal.
136 See Neuner, supra, note 2, at 176.
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property when that property is a product of the common efforts of
the spouses during coverture. However, if the interests are recog-
nized as vested subject to constitutional protection, such an ap-
proach is made impossible.1"'
A subsequent change of domicile or removal of property to
another state will not affect vested marital interests therein, but it
is quite possible that the property will be used to procure new
property in the state to which it was removed, or that rents and
profits will be derived therefrom in the new state after removal.
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws recognizes that new deal-
ings or subsequent transactions concerning the property in the new
state are subject to the laws of that state. 3 ' The new dealings will
be dealt with according to the law of the situs. However, under
the "source" or "replacement" doctrine, existing as local law of
the state to which the property is removed, it is usually held that
property acquired with the proceeds of separate property or prop-
erty acquired with community property remains separate or com-
munity property," 9 as the case may be, so long as such proceeds
can be traced. 4°
It may be noted once again that the impact of the source doc-
trine tends to place American decisions further in an analogous
position with civil law doctrine to the effect that the law of the
original matrimonial domicile governs marital interests in prop-
erty acquired during the entire period of coverture. When the
spouses change their domicile and remove movables to the new
domicile, it is said that the law of the old domicile governs inter-
ests in movables acquired there and in addition, when the source
doctrine is applicable, the law of original domicile governs acqui-
137 Horowitz, supra, note 2, at 224-225; Leflar, supra, note 2, at 226-227, 236-237.
138 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 293b.
139 Lattimer v. Lattimer, 121 Cal. App. 298, 8 P. (2d) 870 (1932) ; Kraemer v.
Kraemer, 52 Cal. 302 (1877) ; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 125 Pac. 796 (1912) ;
Blethen v. Bonner, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 585, 71 S. W. 290 (1902) ; McDaniel v. Harley,
42 S. W. 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897); Oliver v. Robertson, 41 Tex. 422 (1874) ; Brook.
man v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907) , 1 DE FUNIAK, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at § 91; STUMBERG, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 288; Harding, supra, note 2, at 867: Horo-
witz, supra, note 2, at 222.224; Leflar, supra, note 2, at 228-229.
140 In re Gulstine's Estate, 166 Wash 325, 6 P. (2d) 629 (1932).
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sitions and later transactions in the new domicile to the extent of
the proceeds of property acquired at the original domicile are used
therein."' Apparently, absolutely new gains and profits uncon-
nected with proceeds of property acquired at the old domicile
would lose all traces of and be unaffected by the law of the original
domicile.'
CONCLUSION
If the thesis is accepted that marital property rights should be
governed by a single uniform law, then two alternative methods
present themselves for consideration: (1) the French theory of
implied contracts which declares that the first matrimonial domicile
established governs all marital property rights, present or future,
of the spouses wherever they reside; or (2) the Central European
concept which holds that the whole marriage relationship should
be governed by one marital property law applying to the "estate"
of the spouses.
However, the rule that the law of the situs of an immovable
governs the interests which spouses acquire in each other's im-
movable property seems to be too solidly embedded in the internal
law of the United States to ever visualize a deviation therefrom.
And, as to movables, the theory that change of domicile imports a
change of law governing marital interests therein has also become
an American legal cornerstone. Yet it must be emphasized that
the "source" or "replacement" doctrine does often bring the
American decisions very near to the orbit of a single uniform law
applying to marital property for there the original domicilary law
is often again brought into play.
141 See Neuner, supra, note 2, wherein this view is expounded.
142 The fact that the proceeds of the property acquired in the old state of domicile
may be a source of gains and profits in the new state of domicile, may bring about some
complicated accounting problems under the source doctrine. E.g., if a husband and wife
leave a community property state, removing considerable property to a new domicile in
a common law state, the funds or property will often be used by the husband in his
business in the new state. The husband's earnings after the change of domicile would
be his separate property. But the wife under the source doctrine still maintains an inter-
est and is entitled to a portion of the profits to the extent that those profits are made
from the capital investment brought about by her one-half of the community property
left in the husband's business. See Johnson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F.
(2d) 952 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
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The theory of implied contracts would not always bring about
the most just result if the basis underlying the community prop-
erty system, that property acquired during coverture by the joint
efforts of the parties should be treated as a partnership of inter-
ests between the spouses, is desirable. For example, under the
implied contract rule, if spouses were originally domiciled in a
common law state, property acquired during coverture could
never become subject to community property laws no matter where
the parties might later establish their domicile. It would also seem
to be plausible that the so-called consequences of ownership could
be lost by a removal of the spouses to other jurisdictions, for only
the actual ownership of the spouses could be preserved according
to the laws of the original matrimonial domicile.
Therefore, as far as the United States is concerned, a functional
approach... to the whole problem will probably bring about the
most enlightened results in the retention of the joint interests of
the spouses. Under such a theory any law which would uphold
the joint interests of the spouses in post-nuptial property and with
which the property has a material relation or connection, situs or
domicile, could be applied. As opposed to the theory of territorial-
ity which creates rules for the enforcement of foreign created
rights regarded as vested, it is said of the functional theory that
in cases where there is a foreign fact element, the court of the
forum does not enforce foreign created rights, but enforces only
domestic rights with the foreign rules or foreign rights only a
part of the operative facts. Effect therefore is given to the foreign
rules, under a functional approach, only as justice in the case
requires. Application of such a theory would effectively abrogate
the doctrine that marital rights vested in one state may not be
divested upon removal of the domicile or the property to another
jurisdiction, for the functional approach recognizes no vested
foreign rights, but allows each state to create and enforce only
domestic rights.
143 The functional approach is defined by CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEA.L BASES OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAws (1942), and by Horowitz, supra, note 2.
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